In the wake of recent high-profile breaches, the intersection of geopolitical tension and corporate cybersecurity has become a critical frontier for risk management. Simon Glairy, a recognized leader in Insurtech and AI-driven risk assessment, joins us to break down the complexities of defending against state-sponsored digital aggression. With years of experience navigating the nuances of insurance coverage and large-scale incident response, he provides a roadmap for organizations caught in the crosshairs of global conflicts.
State-sponsored cyber activity is increasingly targeting private corporate networks within the United States rather than just regional infrastructure. How does this shift change the risk profile for domestic medical manufacturers, and what specific defense adjustments should leaders prioritize to prevent becoming collateral damage in international conflicts?
The risk profile has shifted from being a potential bystander to becoming a primary target, as national intelligence ministries now view private corporate networks as soft targets for significant wartime cyber attacks. For a company like Stryker, which manages tens of thousands of employees, the surface area for a geopolitical spillover is massive and no longer confined to the Gulf region. Leaders must prioritize a “zero-trust” architecture that assumes the perimeter is already compromised, focusing heavily on credential protection. We are seeing that state actors are moving away from traditional infrastructure sabotage toward disrupting the internal Microsoft systems of manufacturers to cause maximum economic and operational friction.
Attackers are now leveraging compromised employee credentials to exploit device management platforms like Microsoft Intune for large-scale data wiping. What are the primary warning signs of such an intrusion, and what technical steps can IT teams take to isolate these management tools during a suspected breach?
The most alarming warning sign is a sudden, unauthorized spike in administrative activity within device management logs, particularly commands for mass device “retirements” or factory resets. In many cases, these breaches begin with simple phishing to obtain employee or contractor credentials, which then unlock the keys to the entire mobile and laptop fleet. IT teams should implement “conditional access” policies that require hardware-based security keys for any administrative changes within tools like Microsoft Intune. If a breach is suspected, teams must have a pre-configured “kill switch” to revoke all active management tokens and force an immediate re-authentication across the enterprise to prevent a total data wipe of the company’s mobile assets.
When critical internal systems like electronic ordering and shipping go offline, healthcare providers often pause data transmission services out of caution. What specific protocols should a company follow to maintain shipping continuity, and how can they provide assurance to hospital customers that connected products remain safe?
Maintaining continuity requires a pre-validated “offline mode” for electronic ordering systems so that shipping and customer support can transition to manual or air-gapped backups without total paralysis. Transparency is the only way to reassure hospital customers; companies must provide real-time forensic proof that while internal business systems are down, the telemetry and data transmission services for medical devices remain uninfected. In recent incidents, even when systems were functioning normally, hospitals independently chose to pause services out of fear, which highlights the need for a dedicated crisis communication team. This team must deliver verified technical status reports to every client to ensure that life-saving vital sign data transmission remains active during the recovery phase.
Large-scale incidents linked to foreign intelligence services often complicate insurance claims due to war exclusion clauses and state-backed triggers. How should businesses re-evaluate their policy language today, and what documentation is most critical for proving business interruption losses during a forensic investigation?
The recent escalation in Iranian-linked activity means businesses must move away from generic cyber policies and specifically scrutinize the “war exclusion” and “state-backed attack” triggers. Many traditional policies may attempt to deny coverage if the event is labeled “the most significant wartime cyber attack,” so it is vital to negotiate “write-backs” that cover state-sponsored acts of cyber terrorism. During the investigation, the most critical documentation includes detailed forensic logs that pinpoint the origin of the breach and a comprehensive accounting of every hour that electronic ordering or shipping was offline. These records must clearly differentiate between proactive security pauses and direct system failures to ensure that business interruption losses are fully compensable under the specific policy wordings.
Advanced persistent threat groups are increasingly using “hacktivist” personas to mask the involvement of national intelligence ministries. How can forensic investigators differentiate between independent actors and state-sponsored entities, and what are the implications for a company’s public relations strategy when such a link is suspected?
Forensic investigators look past the “hacktivist” branding—like the group Handala—and examine the sophistication of the code and the strategic timing of the attack, which often aligns with national intelligence objectives. While a group may claim to be independent, the use of advanced data-wiping techniques on a global scale usually points back to state resources, such as Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. For a company’s public relations, this creates a delicate balance; you must acknowledge the external threat without sounding alarmist or admitting to a “war-like” event that could trigger insurance exclusions. The narrative should focus on the resilience of the containment efforts and the safety of the products, rather than the geopolitical motivations of the attackers.
What is your forecast for the evolution of state-sponsored cyber warfare against private sector healthcare targets?
I forecast that state-sponsored actors will move beyond mere data theft and toward “operational paralysis” where the primary goal is to freeze the supply chain of medical equipment for extended periods. We will likely see more “living-off-the-land” techniques, where attackers don’t use malware but instead use a company’s own administrative tools to delete data, making detection by standard antivirus software nearly impossible. This will force a shift in the insurance market, where premiums will be tied directly to a company’s ability to prove they have hardened their internal device management platforms. Ultimately, the private sector will have to adopt a “wartime footing” for their cybersecurity, treating their internal networks with the same level of security and redundancy as a national utility.
